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sell, or if it is only an authority to
sell without any direction, then the
land retains its character as land
until it is actually sold. If the
directions of the will, as to pro-
ceeds, require a sale, it is equiva-
lent to a positive direction to sell,
and the land is deemed personal
property from the death of the tes-
tator. In this case the executor
was not directed, nor required to
sell, except so far as a sale was
necessary for the purpose of pay-
ing debts and the legacies directed
to be paid. As to the rest, it was a
mere power which he could exer-
cise or not at his discretion, and
therefore the land must be consid-
ered as having retained its charac-
ter as land until actual sale.
When land for certain purposes
is required to be converted into,
money, and in the sale more is sold
than is required for these purposes,
the excess of proceeds will be con-
sidered as land: Oberle v. Lerch,
iS N. J. Eq., 346.
The rules, as shown by the cases
above digested, seems to-be adopted
universally throughout the United
States: See Holland v. Cruft, 3
Gay (Mass.), 162; Hammond v.
Putnam, Iio Mass., 23-2; Perkins
v. Coghlan, 148 Mass.; Dodge v.
Williams, 64 Wis., 70; Expfarte
McBee, 63 N. C., 332; Loftus v.
Glass, x5 Ark., 68o; Pratt v. Talia-
ferro, 3 Leigh (Va.), 419; James v.
Thockmorton, 57 Cal., 368: Fergu-
son v. Stuart's Ex., 14 Ohio, i4o;
Smithers v. Hooper, 23 Md., 273.
It is the adopted rule that con-
version will be effected where,
either from the will itself or from
the circumstances of any particular
case, the intention of the testator
clearly appears to be that a sale
shall be made, either at once, or at
some fixed time in the future.
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Charity-Perpetuity.
A charitable trust taking effect on a remote contingency in deroga-
tion of another charity, even though it involves a change of trustee, is
valid. In Pennsylvania, under Act of May 9, 1889, P. L., 173, a gift to
a charity is not void although it transgresses the rule against perpe-
tuities.
PER CURIAM, affirming PINROSE J., of the Orphans' Court, Phila-
delphia Co., reported 154 Pa. St., 209.
GIFTS TO CHARITIES AND THE
GIFTS TO CHARITIES AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITEIS.
The proper application of the
rule against perpetuities to charita-
ble devises and bequests has given
rise to some interesting litigation.
It has been said that the question
of remoteness may occur in con-
nection with charitable trusts in
three ways: First, where there is
a gift to 4 charity followed by a
remote gift to an individual; sec-
ond, a gift to an individual fol-
lowe'd by a remote gift to a charity;
and third, a gift to a charity fol-
lowed by a remote gift to another
charity: Gray on Perpetuities,
592. To which may be added a
fourth class, where there is an exe
cutory devise to a charity to take
effect upon a contingency possibly
remote.
The first two classes have always
been regarded as subject to the rule
against perpetuities, and need no
discussion: Company of Pewterers
v. Christ Hospital, I Vern., i61;
Merrit v. Bucknam, 77 Me., 253;
Theological Society v. Atty-Gen.,
135 Mass., 285; Commissioners v.
De Clifford, I Dr. & W., 245. But
it is to be remembered that where
the object of the- charitable trust
has ceased to exist, a clause restor-
ing the property to the family of
the testator has been held good:
Atty-Gen. v. Pyle, I Atk., 435;
Walsh v. The Secretary, io H. L.
Ca., 367; Randell v. Dixon, 38
Ch. D., 213.
The third, and to a limited ex-
tent the fourth class, have been
regarded as free from objection on
the ground of remoteness, an ex-
ception worth consideration. To
do this it is necessary to examine
the purpose of the rule itself. If
the object of the rule is to prevent
perpetual holdiug, if "the ability
to alienate" is the test, then no
logical objection can be made to
the exception. If a perpetuity has
no other meaning than "an in-
alienable, indestructible interest,"
then it is but a natural sequence
that the policy of the law, which
permits the creation of charitable
trusts for the purpose of holding
property forever, should also. pro-
tect them from such rules as would
defeat that policy. If, on the other
hand, the rule against perpetuities
is, as Mr. GRAY states, directed not
to preventing the alienation of
present interests, but against the
creation of remote future interests,
the exception loses its logical con-
sistency, and is open to the objec-
tions that are always to be urged
against purely arbitrary rules, how-
ever great their seeming utility.
It is universally conceded that
Mr. GRAY has stated the rule
against perpetuities correctly, and
in all cases involving private inter-
ests it will be found that the courts
have made the time of vesting the
controllfig feature. But in cases
of charities unconnected with pri-
vate interests the courts have set
aside this view and have based their
reasoning upon the theory that the
rule is directed against perpetual
holding, thus involving the rule in
an ambiguity distressing to accu-
rate thinkers.
The cases discussing this subject
are not numerous. The first of
sufficient importance to merit at-
tention is, The Society for the Pro-
pagation of the Gospel v. Atty-
Gen., 3 Russ., 142. Atestator, dy-
ing in 1715, directed hib executors
to pay the Society one thousand
pounds, after the consecration of
two Protestant bishops, one for the
continent and one for the islands
of North America, the income in
the meantime to be applied for the
benefit of missionaries of the So-
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ciety. When in 1824 the bishops
were appointed the fund was
awarded to the Society with little
discussion, as there were practi-
cally no conflicting claims.
The whole question, however,
was raised in Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger, 16 Sim., 83; I MacN. &
G., 460; i H. & Tw., 533, properly
regarded as the leading case. Prop-
erty has been devised to the cor-
poration of Reading upon charit-
able trusts, with a proviso that if
the corporation should fail to per-
form its duties as trustee for one
year, the property should go to
the corporation of London for the
benefit of Christ's Hospital. The
corporation failed to perform its
duties as trustee, and the question
was upon the validity of the gift
over. Since property held for
charitable purposes is forever in-
alienable, the lord chancellor rea-
soned, the rule against perpetuities
did not apply. The property was
neither more nor less alienable be-
cause given from one charity to
another. "Here," says Mr. GRAY,
"with submission to so great an
authority (Lord COTTgNHAM) is
the common confusion between
perpetuity in the sense of inalien-
ability and perpetiuity in the sense
of remoteness." And, although
the decision has long stood as
authoritative, be would have it ex-
amined with a view to its rejection
in any jurisdiction where the mat-
ter is not closed.
English writers have not felt
called upon to offer objections to
the ruling: Marsden on Perpetui-
ties, 295; Tyssen on Charitable Be-
quests, 423; re Coinington's Will,
8 W. R., 444. And the decision
has met with approval in a recent
case in the Court of Appeals: In re
Tyler (1891), 3 Ch., 252. Testator
5
gave a fund to trustees of the Lon-
don Missionary Society, and com-
mitted the keys of his family vault
in Highgate Cemetery to their
charge, the same to be lbept in
good repair. Failing to comply
with this request, the money to go
to the Blue Coat School. The
society, although willing to com-
ply with wishes of the testator, ob-
jected to having the gift clogged
with such a condition, contending
with great justice that it would en-
able the testator to do indirectly
that which he could not do directly,
namely, to create a perpetual trust
for a non-charitable object. The
court, however, thought the case
fell directly within the principle
upon which Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger (sup ra) was dqcided.
And as to the suggestion that it
would open the way to evasions of
the law, it was thought that the
decision would not go to the length
of holding "that one could get out
of the rule against perpetuities by,
making a charity a trustee." That,
said the court would be absurd.
Much was said about the compara-
tively harmless nature of the condi-,
tion attached to the bequest; but,
though harmless, it was none the
less for a private purpose, and
renders it difficult to decide where
the line is to be drawn.
Where the gift is for the estab-
lishment of a charity, subject to a
condition precedent, such, for ex-
ample, as a gift of land for a site,
the court has not subjected such
gifts to the rule against remoteness,
but has laid down the general
principle that all such conditions
must be fulfilled within rbason-
able time. This applies only where
the gift is immediately and en-
tirely devoted to charity. If per-
sonal estate is once effectively
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given to charity, it is taken out of
the scope of the law of remoteness.
But if the gift in trust for charity
is itself conditional upon a future
and uncertain event, it is regarded
as subject to the same rules and
principles as any other estate de-
pending for its coming into ex-
istence upon a condition precedent:
Synnett v. Herbert L. R., 7 Ch.,
232.
In Chamberlayne v. Brockett,
L. R., 8 Ch., 2o6, there was a gift
for the erection of alms houses
"when and so soon as land shall
at any time be given for the pur-
pose." The master of the rolls
thought the gift void for remote-
ness, inasmuch as it was dependent
upon an event which might not
arise for an indefinite time. The
lord chancellor thought that there
was an immediate gift for charity.
The case in re White's Trusts is a
complete illustration of the work-
ing of the rule. Testator left a
fund for the erection of alms
houses when a proper site could
be obtained.' The gift was held
good if the site were provided: 30
W. R., 837; but the trustees failing
to obtain a site within reasonable
time, it was held that the legacy
lapsed: 33 Ch. D., 449.
The rule in Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger has been quoted with ap-
proval in the American courts, but
the question has seldom been
directly raised. In the majority of
instances the contest has been be-
tween the heirs-at-law and the ex-
ecutors, or testamentary trustees.
Under such circumstances the na-
tural inclination of a court will be
in favor of sustaining the charit-
able intentions of the testator, and
arguments which are calculated to
restrict or perhaps defeat such in-
tentions, will he distrusted. To
fairly test the rule, it would be
necessary for the point to arise in
a suit by one charity to obtain the
benefit of the gift over, upon the
happening of the remote con-
tingency which is to divest the
previous charitable gift.
The decision in Christ's Hos-
pital v. Grainger met with appr6val
in Odell v. Odell, io Allen, i. Here
the trust was for the accumulation
of income for fifty years, and then
to charity. Justice GRAY, in re-
viewing the authorities, made par-
ticular mention of the leading case.
Seven years later the same distin-
guished jurist had occasion to con-
sider this question, then before the
United States Supreme Court: The
will in dispute directed that in case
the institutions named as bene-
ficiaries attempted to alienate the
property devised, the executors
were to enter and repossess the
property, and in that event the
property was devised to an orphad
asylum: Jones v. Habersham, 107
U.S., 174. The Court could not
see how the next of kin could be
benefited whether the devise- over
were void or valid, but stated that
"as an estate is no more perpetual
in two successive charities than in
one charity, and as the rule against
perpetuities does not apply to char-
ities, it follows that if a gift is
made to one charity and then over
to another charity 'upon the hap-
pening of a 'contingency which
may or may not take place within
the limit of that rule, the limita-
tion over to the second charity is
good."
The statement in the opinion
that "the rule against perpetuities
does not apply to charities" was
incautious. That it does apply
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to a limited extent was recog-
nized in Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S.,
163, where a rule was adopted that
has been widely quoted, "a gift
for a charity not existing at the
date of the gift, and the beginning
of whose existence is uncertain, or
which is to take effect upon a con-
tingency which may possibly not
happen within a life or lives in be-
ing and twenty-one years after-
wards is valid provided there is no
gift of the property meanwhile to
or for the benefit of any private
corporation or persdn." The lan-
guage of the Court may have re-
ferred to those cases only where
the gift is to a non-existent char-
ity, or to a charity upon the hap-
pening of a possibly remote con-
tingency without a previous gift.
But the rule has been extended
equally to those cases where the
gift is from one charity over to an-
other: Stoors Agricultural School
v. Whitney, 54 Conn., 342.
The question then arises, -what
is meant by an immediate gift
to charity from this point of
,view? The courts of Connec-
ticut have been compelled to an-
swer this question. In Jocelyn
v. Nott, 44 Conn., 55, the gift was
to trustees, directing that if any
Congregational church should de-
sire to erect a meeting-house upon
the land devised, and the trustees
should be satisfied that the church
was able to complete the same free
from debt, the trustees were to con-
vey the land to the church. "The
devise," said the Court, "is vested
only in the trustees, and no inter-
est whatever has as yet vested in
the party intended to be benefited,
and as such an interest may never
vest, the devise tends to create a
perpetuity in the trustees and vest
in them property which for all
time to come may remain inalien-
able. This the law will not allow."
On the other hand, in Woodruff v.
March, 26 A., 846 (Conn.), testa-
tor left his residuary estate to
trustees for the establishment of a
school, providing certain lands and
buildings in W - be given free of
cost for a location of the school.
The court found in other parts of
the will an intention to limit this
proviso to the period of twenty
years; but conceding that there
was no such intention, the gift to
the trustees was an immediate gift
to charity, and should the land not
be given within a reasonable time
the intenued purpose of the trust
might fail, but it would be by the
non-performance of a condition
subsequent. See also New Haven
Institute v. New Haven, 6o Conn.,
32.
In Pennsylvania, the views of
the Supreme Court, as expressed
in the earlier cases, were not in
harmony with Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger. but in the long interval
of time that elapsed before it be-
came necessary to pass upon the
question these views underwent a
change. In Hilliard v. Miller, the
devise was to certain church cor-
porations to lend the income from
the fund to young farmers and
mechanics in loans secured by
mortgages, and if the income
should accumulate beyond the ap-
plication for loans, then to apply
the income to the erection of a
hospital. it was decided that the
first trust was not a charity, and,
therefore, an illegal accumulation,
and that since the. gift to the hos-
pital was not immediate, and might
not vest within the legal period, it
also fell: io Pa. St., 326.
While this is the only early case
bearing directly on the question,
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the words of the Chief Justice in
Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs are
worth noting in this connection.
The facts need not be mentioned
as the Court went somewhat out of
its way in discussing the subject.
"Suppose," it was said, "that
some of the directions given for
the management of the Charity are
conditions upon which a new
charity is depending, they would,
therefore, on the showing of the
claimants here, be void conditions
of the new charity, because they
may not happen within the time
allowed forthe vesting of executory
devises, and, therefore, could not
divest the already vested charity.
Their character is such as to avoid
rather the substitutionary charities
than the principal and vested one:"
45 Pa. St, 29. It can hardly be
doubted that a court expressing
such views would, if a case had
then arisen, have rendered a deci-
sion adverse to Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger.
Time has wrought a change in
the views of the courts, and it is
not surprising to find to-day a
sentiment overwhelmingly in favor
of aiding and upholding charitable
bequests by the use of every rule
of construction that can reasonably
be turned to their advantage. In
the case of Franklin's E3state, xSo
Pa. St., 437, testator bequeathed
£Iooo to the city of Philadelphia
in trust to let out the same to young
married artificers, and at the end of
terms in gross of ioo and 200 years
the fund with accumulations to go
to the city and State for designated
charitable purposes. It was urged
on behalf of the petitioners, the
representatives of the residuary
legatee, that Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger was not law in Pennsyl-
vania. Conceding that the first
gift was non-charitable and also
that a contingent gift to a non-
existing charity -beyond the period
allowed by the rule against per-
petuities is void, the Orphans'
Court could not see how this would
favor the petitioners. "The gift,
though its application for the pur-
pose ultimately intended was de-
ferred, was immediate, and the
beneficiary was itself the trustee:"
27 W. N. C, 545.
In the Supreme Court the appeal
was dismissed on a question of
jurisdiction, and in consequence
the matter was brought before the
Common Pleas Court, 2 Pa. Dist.,
435-
Passing over Hilliard v. Miller,
supra, where a strikingly similar
trust was characterized as "a loan
office in the garb of a charity,"
the bequest for the aid of the young
married artificers was held a good,
charitable gift, and that on the
whole Dr. Franklin's will "estab-
lished in legal form three valid,
benevolent and beneficial charities,
neither one of which is vulnerable
when assaulted upon any of* the
grounds which were argued before,
us." While admitting that Phila-
delphia v. Girard's Heirs (supra)
correctly stated some of the objec-
tions to a perpetuity, the Court
declared that "the greater objec-
tion is the accumulation of a large
fund in individual hands, thereby
creating a -menace to the com-
munity." The danger arising from
accumulations did not disturb the
courts until long after the rule
against perpetuities was settled law:
Thellusson Act, 39 George III, c.
98. Objections on the ground of un-
lawful accumulation and objections
on the ground of remoteness have
always been treated as entirely dis-
tinct when historically considered.
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
So that if this opinion is literally
adopted it will certainly add a new
feature to the rule against remote-
ness.
In Lennig's Estate, 154 Pa. St.,
209, the case annotated, the Court,
in discussing Christ's Hospital v.
Grainger, points out that the case
is much stronger in favor of the
ultimate charity where there is no
change of trustees. But "whatever
may be said of the soundness of
the reasoning of Lord COT'uNuAM,
by whom the opinion was delivered,
the question it would seem is no
longer an open one in Pennsyl-
vania, where the legislature has
come to the relief of the judiciary
by passing the Act of May 9th,
1889, P. L., 173, which in the most
unequivocal terms declares that a
gift for a charity shall not fail be-
cause transgressive of the rule
against perpetuities." The act
cited adds little to that of i85s,
P. L., 33r, which designed to extend
the cy fires doctrine in Pennsyl-
vania, Bisphain's Equity (5th ed.)
p. 197, n. 5, was not appealed to
in questions of remoteness: Roger's
Estate, 43 Leg. Int., 292. And it
might naturally have been inferred
that the Acts of 1885, P. L., 259,
and of 1889, P. L., 173, -were
"merely auxiliary to and in aid of
the purposes of the former acts
upon the same subject:" Pepper's
Estate, 154 Pa. St., 33r. The judi-
cial interpretation of the act, how-
ever, is final: Lewis' Estate, x Dist.
Rep., r48, and the rule against per-
petuities practically eliminated
from the law of charitable bequests
in Pennsylvania. The act is as
follows:
SEcTIoN x.-" Be it enacted, etc.,
That no disposition of property
heretofore or hereafter made for
any religious or. charitable use
shall fail for want of a trustee or
by reason of the objects ceasing,
or depending upon the discretion
of a last trustee, or in excess of the
annual value limited bylaw; but
it shall be the duty of any court
having equity jurisdiction in the
proper county, to supply a trustee
and by its decrees carry into effect
the intent of the donor or testator
so far as the same can be ascertained
and carried into effect consistently
with law or equity subject to an
appeal as in other cases, etc."
The courts of New York having
rejected the common-law doctrines
regarding charities, have placed
the law of charitable bequests upon
a basis radically different from that
of England: Bascom v. Albertson,
34 N. Y., 584; Holland v. Alcock,
io8 N. Y., 312. The valiaity of
trusts, therefore, for objects which
the English law describes as chat-
itable, are in New York governed
by the same rules, by which the
validity of trusts for private pur-
poses are determined. In every
case the vesting must take place
within two lives in being at the
time of testator's death : Cottman
v. Grace, 112 N. Y., 299. The ob-
jection is not to the perpetual
holding of property, for a gift to a
duly incorporated charitable insti-
tution, for the purposes of its crea-
tion, is perfectly good: Holmes v.
Mead, 52 N. Y., 332; In re Strick-
land's Estate, 17 N. Y. Supplement,
304.
The chief difficulty has arisen in
the case of a bequest to a corpora-
tion non-existent at thd time of tes-
tator's death. If the will expressly
provides that the corporation must
be created within the period al-
lowed for the vesting of future
estates, the gift is valid: Shipman
v. Robbins, 98 N. Y., 3rn; Burrill
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v. Boardman, 43 N. Y., 254. In the
latter case the testator provided for
the establishment of a hospital, to
be incorporated within two years
after testator's death, provided two
lives named in his will should con-
tinue so long. The decision in
favor of the validity of this gift
was regarded as "a pronounced
departure from what was supposed
to be the rule governing charitable
bequests :" People v. Simonson,
126 N. Y., 299, and the conditions
of the law are to be strictly main-
tained. In Cruishank v. Home of
the Friendless, 113 N. Y., 337, the
executqrs were to apply as soon as
practicable to the legislature for-an
act incorporating the institution.
The trust was held incapable of
being sustained for'the reason that
the incorporation was dependent
upon the will of the legislature, and
the-period of delay contingent upon
the action of the State was not
measured by lives: Booth v. Bap-
tist Church, 126 N. Y., 215 ; Tilden
v. Green, i3o N. Y., 29.
With the law so adverse to gifts
for haritable purposes it seems
hardly possible that the question of
a gift over fro i one charity to an-
other, upon a remotd contingency,
could be raised in New York. The
point, however, has been alluded to
in one of the inferior courts: In re
Williams' Estate, x Misc. Rep., N.
Y., 44o. The bequest was to trus-
tees, to apply the income from the
fund to the payment of the salary
of the pastor of a church, subject
to the condition that, if ever the
said church should become extinct,
the trustees were to turn over the
amount'held in trust to the Board
of Church Extension. This last
gift over, the Court remarked, "was
hopelessly bad, and no attempt was
made on the argument to defend
it."
The will construed in the case of
Judevine v. Judevine, 6I Vt., 589,
contains clauses that might have
called for explanation if the ques-
tion of remoteness had been raised.
A trust-fund was set apart for the
education of deserving young men,
and at any time after five years
from testator's decease the execu-
tors mightin theirdiscretion appro-
priatewhat remained to the towns
of C and H for school purposes. A
codicil provided, "should either
town, or both, neglect to carry out
the provisions set forth by me, the
fund delivered and paid to such
town by my executor is to be col-.
lected from such town and placed
in some other town that will carry
out my desires." As the court did
notfind it necessary to refer to this
last clause, it must be presumed
that no difficulty was presented to
its mind in regard to the remote-
ness of thegift over to the unnamed
towns.
Although technical objections
may be urged against the ruling in
Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, based
as it is said to be upon a miscon-
ception of the purpose of the rule
against perpetuities, it is far from
likely that it ever will be disturbed.
It is always, of course, more satis-
factory when legal conclusions are
drawn from clear, true, and unam-
biguous premises, but the precedent
has been found useful and conve-
nient for citation, * those conflicts
where the charitable intentions of
the testator are opposed by the
claims of collaterals. If it is to be
the policy of the law that charitable
gifts are to be favored to the great-
est possible extent, then the rule
azainst perpetuiti z must yield to
that policy.
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